WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism(6)/刘成伟

作者:法律资料网 时间:2024-07-22 10:52:32   浏览:8969   来源:法律资料网
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Chapter VI
General Rules of Evidence
under the WTO Jurisprudence


OUTLINE

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
(ⅰ) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
(ⅱ) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
(ⅲ) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
(ⅳ) Summary and Conclusions
II Admissibility of Certain Evidences
(ⅰ) Evidence Obtained from Prior Consultations
(a) Procedural Concern: Confidentiality of Consultations
(b) Substantial Concern: Necessity or Relevance of Evidence
(ⅱ) Arguments before Domestic Investigative Authorities
(ⅲ) Arguments Submitted after the First Substantive Meeting
(a) There is a significant difference between the claims and the arguments supporting those claims.
(b)There is no provision establishing precise deadlines for the presentation of evidence.
III Panel’s Right to Seek Information
(ⅰ) A Grant of Discretionary Authority
(ⅱ) The Admissibility of Non-requested Information
(ⅲ) Summary and Conclusions
IV Adverse Inferences from Party’s Refusal to Provide Information Requested
(ⅰ) The Authority of a Panel to Request Information from a Party to the Dispute
(ⅱ) The Duty of a Member to Comply with the Request of a Panel to Provide Information
(ⅲ) The Drawing of Adverse Inferences from the Refusal of a Party to Provide Information Requested by the Panel
V Concluding Remarks

I Burden of Proof under the WTO Jurisprudence
Generally, the question of whether a member acted in accordance with the agreement hinges frequently on whether and to what extent that member must demonstrate compliance or the complaint must demonstrate a lack of compliance. It is demonstrated that the burden of proof is a procedural concept which speaks to the fair and orderly management and disposition of a dispute. This is the issue of “the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”. In this respect, the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160) states, “[w]hile a duty rests on all parties to produce evidence and to cooperate in presenting evidence to the Panel, this is an issue that has to be distinguished from the question of who bears the ultimate burden of proof for establishing a claim or a defence”.1
(i) General Rules Well Established in Violation Complaints
Art. 3.8 of the DSU provides that in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement -- that is, in cases where a violation is established -- there is a presumption of nullification or impairment. However, the issue of burden of proof here is not what happens after a violation is established; the issue is which party must first show that there is, or is not, a violation. In this respect, a number of GATT 1947 panel reports contain language supporting the proposition that the burden of establishing a violation under Article XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1947 was on the complaining party, i.e., it was for the complaining party to present a prima facie case of violation before a panel. This rule is taken on by the DSB.
With regard to the issue of burden of proof, the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33) rules that: “In addressing this issue, we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.” 2And this ruling is demonstrated to be well established in subsequent cases as a general rule concerning burden of proof.
For example, in Argentina-Leather (DS155), the Panel states: “The relevant rules concerning burden of proof, while not expressly provided for in the DSU, are well established in WTO jurisprudence. The general rule is set out in the Appellate Body report on United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, wherein it is stated that: ‘It is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption’.” 3
And in US-Cotton Yarn (DS192), the Panel rules in pertinent part: “The Appellate Body and subsequent panels endorsed this principle that a complainant bears the burden of proof. For example, the Appellate Body, in EC - Hormones, states as follows: ‘… The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States - Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.’” 4
As a whole, on the one hand, as ruled by the Panel in Argentina-Ceramic Floor Tiles (DS189), “[w]e recall that the burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings rests with the party that asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. It implies that the complaining party will be required to make a prima facie case of violation of the relevant provisions of the WTO Agreement, which is for the defendant…to refute. In this regard, the Appellate Body has stated that ‘... a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case’…”; 5 on the other hand, as noted in the Panel Report on US-Copyright Act (DS160), “[t]he same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact is alleged. We note that a party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof thereof. It is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence. It is then for the other party to submit evidence to the contrary if it challenges the existence of that fact”. 6
In sum, with respect to the general rules of burden of proof in the context of violation complaints, as ruled by the Panel in Japan-Film (DS44): “[w]e note that as in all cases under the WTO/GATT dispute settlement system - and, indeed, as the Appellate Body recently stated, under most systems of jurisprudence - it is for the party asserting a fact, claim or defence to bear the burden of providing proof thereof. Once that party has put forward sufficient evidence to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, the burden of producing evidence then shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption.…”. 7Certainly, as noted by the Appellate Body in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), “[i]n the context of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement precisely how much and precisely what kind of evidence will be required to establish such a presumption will necessarily vary from measure to measure, provision to provision and case to case”.8
(ii) Burden of Proof in case of Invoking an Exception
As discussed above, generally, the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts a fact or the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. As to be shown, this rule applies equally even in case of invoking an exception.
In this context, it is a general principle of law, well-established by panels in prior GATT/WTO practice, that the party (the defendant) which invokes an exception in order to justify its action carries the burden of proof that it has fulfilled the conditions for invoking the exception. However, in the author’s view, to understand the issue concerning burden of proof in case of invoking an exception, which is different from the relatively clear burden of establishing a prima facie case of violation on the complaining party, it’s helpful to stress some points here, among which the key point is to be cautious while determine which defence is “affirmative” and therefore burdens the defendant to provide sufficient evidence to rebut the challenged violation.
In United States-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), India argues that it was “customary GATT practice” that the party invoking a provision which had been identified as an exception must offer proof that the conditions set out in that provision were met. The Appellate Body acknowledges that several GATT 1947 and WTO panels have required such proof of a party invoking a defence, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i), to a claim of violation of a GATT obligation, such as those found in Arts. I:1, II:1, III or XI:1. Arts. XX and XI:(2)(c)(i) are limited exceptions from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994, not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the nature of affirmative defences. It is only reasonable that the burden of establishing such a defence, i.e. invoking an exception in the nature of affirmative defences, should rest on the party asserting it. 9
However, as ruled by the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), “[t]he general rule in a dispute settlement proceeding requiring a complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a provision of …[the covered agreements] before the burden of showing consistency with that provision is taken on by the defending party, is not avoided by simply describing that same provision as an ‘exception’. In much the same way, merely characterizing a treaty provision as an ‘exception’ does not by itself justify a ‘stricter’ or ‘narrower’ interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words, viewed in context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, or, in other words, by applying the normal rules of treaty interpretation. It is also well to remember that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the defending party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the complaining party presenting the prima facie case.” 10
In short, during the process of the establishment of a violation, it’s generally up to the complainant to provide evidence concerning inconsistency, and only in case of limited exceptions the burden of proof rests upon the defending party invoking a defence in the nature of affirmative defences, such as those found in Art. XX or Art. XI:2(c)(i) of the GATT 1994.
(iii) Special Rules Concerning Non-Violation Claims
As suggested by the corresponding provisions, the most significant difference between violation complaints under Art. XXIII:1(a) of the GATT 1994 and non-violation ones under Art. XXIII:1(b) is, while, when violation complaints are brought under Art. XXIII:1(a), the infringement of an obligation of the agreements is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment, from the fact of violation alone, by establishing a formal presumption, such a presumption does not exist in non-violation cases.
With the lack of such a presumption, and given the nature of the factually complex disputes and particular claims of non-violation nullification or impairment, the resolution of issues relating to the proper allocation of the burden of proof is of particular importance. In case of non-violation nullification or impairment, i.e., where the application of Art. XXIII:1(b) is concerned, Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU and panel practice in the context of the WTO Agreement and GATT jurisprudence confirm that this is an exceptional course of action for which the complaining party bears the burden of providing a detailed justification to back up its allegations.
This requirement has been recognized and applied by a number of GATT panels. For example, the panel on Uruguayan Recourse to Art. XXIII noted that in cases “where there is no infringement of GATT provisions, it would be ... incumbent on the country invoking Article XXIII to demonstrate the grounds and reasons for its invocation. Detailed submissions on the part of that contracting party on these points were therefore essential for a judgement to be made under this Article”. And the panel on US - Agricultural Waiver noted, in applying the 1979 codification of this rule: “The party bringing a complaint under [Article XXIII:1(b)] would normally be expected to explain in detail that benefits accruing to it under a tariff concession have been nullified or impaired”.
Art. 26.1(a) of the DSU codifies the prior GATT practice, which provides in relevant part: “the complaining party shall present a detailed justification in support of any complaint relating to a measure which does not conflict with the relevant covered agreement ...”.
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全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于罢免全国人民代表大会常务委员会民族委员会法案委员会和国防委员会中的右派分子黄绍竑等十人的职务的建议

全国人民代表大会常务委员会


全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于罢免全国人民代表大会常务委员会民族委员会法案委员会和国防委员会中的右派分子黄绍竑等十人的职务的建议


1957年6月26日至7月15日举行的全国人民代表大会第四次会议,曾经把关于撤销右派分子全国人民代表大会代表资格和其他职务问题,交由全国人民代表大会常务委员会酌量情况处理。现在就这个问题提出建议如下:
(一)截至这次大会以前,已经由原选举单位正式撤销全国人民代表大会代表资格的右派分子有钱端升、沈志远、杨逸棠、江丰、刘兰畦、沙文汉、杨思一、王国松、李士豪、宋云彬、姚顺甫、冯雪峰、曾昭抡、向德、谭惕吾、雷天觉16人。其中钱端升所担任的全国人民代表大会法案委员会委员、曾昭抡所担任的全国人民代表大会预算委员会委员,当然随着代表资格的撤销而撤销。
(二)关于右派分子章乃器、潘大逵、曾庶凡、黄绍竑、陈铭枢、黄现璠、费振东、乔传珏、马哲民、章伯钧、叶笃义、程士范、潘锷鏱、罗隆基、费孝通、储安平、钱伟长、钱孙卿、欧百川、王天锡、韩兆鹗、丁玲、张东木、谢雪红、杨子恒、郑立齐、黄琪翔、李伯球、徐铸成、黄药眠、王毅齐、张轸、张云川、朱君允、毕鸣岐、谭志清、龙云、李琢菴38人的代表资格问题,代表资格审查委员会已经向大会提出建议,认为他们已经丧失继续执行全国人民代表大会代表职务的合法根据,不应当出席第一届全国人民代表大会第五次会议。因此,常务委员会决定建议大会罢免黄绍竑、龙云、陈铭枢全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员的职务,罢免费孝通、黄现璠、欧百川全国人民代表大会民族委员会委员的职务,罢免张云川、陈铭枢、黄绍竑、黄琪翔、谢雪红、罗隆基全国人民代表大会法案委员会委员的职务,罢免龙云国防委员会副主席的职务,罢免黄琪翔国防委员会委员的职务。
请大会予以审议。
全国人民代表大会常务委员会
1958年1月31日




澳门特别行政区第7/1999号法律:澳门特别行政区处理居民国籍申请的具体规定

澳门


澳 门 特 别 行 政 区
第7/1999号法律

澳门特别行政区处理居民国籍申请的具体规定

立法会根据《澳门特别行政区基本法》第七十一条(一)项,制定本法律。


第一条
处理国籍申请的机关
根据《中华人民共和国国籍法》和《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于<中华人民共和国国籍法>在澳门特别行政区实施的几个问题的解释》的规定,指定澳门特别行政区身份证明局(下称身份证明局),处理澳门特别行政区居民有关国籍的申请(下称申请)。
第二条
申请的种类
申请包括下列种类:
(一)外国人或无国籍人加入中国国籍;
(二)中国公民退出中国国籍;
(三)曾有过中国国籍的外国人恢复中国国籍;
(四)具有中国血统但又具有葡萄牙血统的居民选择中国国籍;
(五)具有其它国籍的原澳门居民中的中国公民变更国籍。
第三条
申请的提出
一、国籍申请须填妥有关表格。
二、国籍申请可直接向身份证明局递交。如申请人不在澳门地区居住,可向居住地的中华人民共和国驻外国的外交代表机关、领事机关和外交部授权的其它驻外机关递交。
三、国籍申请可包括申请人的配偶、及其未成年子女。未成年人的国籍申请须由父母双方签名。
四、在递交国籍申请时须附同下列有效文件的正副本:
(一)澳门居民身份证、或澳门特别行政区永久居民身份证、或澳门特别行政区居民身份证;
(二)出生证明;
(三)已婚、离婚、丧偶、或法院裁定的分居及分产的证明文件,但申请人是未婚者除外。
五、如在身份证明局的档案中存有申请人依本法律规定须提供的证明文件,则可豁免递交该等文件。
六、除本条规定外,申请人还须根据申请的种类递交本法律第四至第八条规定的其它有关文件。
第四条
加入中国国籍的申请
一、只有澳门特别行政区的永久性居民中的外国人或无国籍人可申请加入中国国籍。
二、为着上款之目的﹐申请者须:
(一)递交是中国人的近亲属的证明文件或者有正当理由加入中国国籍;
(二)除无国籍者外,须递交具有外国国籍的证明;
(三)澳门特别行政区发出的从发出之日起不超过九十日的刑事纪录证明书;如在澳门特别行政区居住前曾在其它地区居住六个月或以上,且在该地区居住时已满十六周岁者﹐还须递交申请人原居地发出的从发出之日起不超过九十日的刑事纪录证明书;
(四)证明其本人、或配偶、或父母(如属未成年申请者)具有经济能力。
第五条
退出中国国籍的申请
申请退出中国国籍的中国公民如有外国国籍,须递交有关证明;还须递交是外国人的近亲属或定居外国的证明文件,又或有正当理由退出中国国籍。
第六条
恢复中国国籍的申请
恢复中国籍的申请须附同曾有过中国国籍及具有外国国籍的证明文件。
第七条
选择中国国籍的申请
一.选择中国国籍的申请还须附同具有中国血统但又具有葡萄牙血统的声明。
二.如身份证明局局长对上款所指的声明有疑问,可要求其递交有关证明文件。
第八条
变更国籍的申请
在澳门特别行政区成立前或以后从海外返回澳门的原澳门居民中的中国公民﹐其变更国籍的申请须附同具有外国国籍的证明。
第九条
近亲属
本法所指的近亲属包括:申请人的配偶、父母、子女及兄弟姐妹。
第十条
自由裁量权
一、身份证明局局长对国籍申请的审批行使自由裁量权。
二、身份证明局局长的决定是最终决定,利益人可按一般规定对之提起司法上诉。
第十一条
申请的审核
一、国籍申请由身份证明局局长进行审核,并将有关决定通知申请人。
二、在审核国籍申请时,国家、特区安全及公共秩序的因素应优先给予考虑。
三、如加入或恢复国籍的申请被批准,除无国籍者外,申请人须在接到通知之日起六个月内递交放弃外国国籍的证明文件,否则有关决定失效。
四、身份证明局在收到上款所列的文件五日后,或如不属加入或恢复国籍的情况下,则在发出批准通知五日后,由该局发出最新国籍登记的证明文件。
第十二条
通知
一、特区政府定期向中央人民政府有权限机关送交获批准的国籍申请。
二、在澳门出生的居民的国籍申请如获批准,身份证明局于五个工作日内通知有权限的登记机关。
第十三条
收费
一、身份证明局在处理本法规定的国籍申请及发出国籍证明时应收取费用。
二、费用的具体金额由行政长官订定。
三、如申请不被批准﹐所缴款项不予退还。
第十四条
生效
本法律自一九九九年十二月二十日起生效。
一九九九年十二月二十日通过。
立法会主席
曹其真
一九九九年十二月二十日签署。
命令公布。
行政长官
何厚铧